Quantum cryptography is on the verge of commercial application. One of its greatest limitations is over long distance-secret key rates are low and the longest fibre over which any key has been exchanged is currently 100 km. We investigate the quantum relay, which can increase the maximum distance at which quantum cryptography is possible. The relay splits the channel into sections and sends a different photon across each section, increasing the signal-to-noise ratio. The photons are linked as in teleportation, with entangled photon pairs and Bell measurements. We show that such a scheme could allow cryptography over hundreds of kilometres with today's detectors. It could not, however, improve the rate of key exchange over distances where the standard single section scheme already works. We also show that reverse key reconciliation, previously used in continuous variable quantum cryptography, gives a secure key over longer distances than forward key reconciliation.
Introduction
Security of transmitted information forms a key part of internet shopping, internet banking and remote access to corporate networks. Since no cryptosystem is perfect, one would like to use the most secure system possible. Quantum cryptography [1] promises to be a key part of that system. Its strength is that it is based upon a fundamentally different assumption to all currently available systems. While they are based upon our knowledge of the time required to perform certain computations, quantum cryptography is based upon our knowledge of the laws of physics and in particular quantum mechanics.
Quantum cryptography is currently in the development stage. One implementation is to send bits as time-bin single photons down a fibre optic cable and to use quantum complementarity to detect the presence of any eavesdropper. Many experiments have shown its practicality, including recently over a physical distance of 67 km [2] and over 100 km of fibre in the laboratory [3] .
A limitation to the development of quantum cryptography is its performance over distance. Two effects come into play here. The first is the exponential loss of signal, and hence bit rate, with increasing distance. The second is the fundamental insecurity of the quantum cryptosystem at long distances due to a roughly constant level of noise dominating the exponentially decreasing signal. Both these obstacles can be overcome in theory using a quantum repeater [4] . This is the idea of breaking up the channel into several short sections and creating a perfect entangled pair spanning each section, before using entanglement swapping to make a single entangled pair spanning the whole channel. The entangled pair can then be used to make a secret key, using for example the Ekert protocol [5] . In order to make a perfect entangled pair across a single section, we send many pairs, each of which arrives with a small amount of noise and possibly not at all. We then use a quantum memory, non-demolition measurement and entanglement purification [6] to make one perfect entangled pair.
The main problem with such a scheme is precisely that it requires a complicated set of quantum operations, a quantum memory and a photon nondemolition measurement. All these seem impractical in the near future.
A simpler scheme which is on the verge of being implemented is the quantum relay [1, [7] [8] [9] [10] . This works in the same way as the quantum repeater, only without the entanglement purification, the quantum memory, or the non-demolition measurement. It no longer combats the exponential loss of signal with distance, but does increase the maximum distance over which secure quantum key distribution is possible. This is achieved through an increase in the signal-to-noise ratio at each detector, since each photon only has to pass some fraction of the total channel.
For us a quantum 'relay' with a single section is the standard BB84 [11] protocol where we send a photon from Alice to Bob (see figure 1 ). Two sections means we put a source of entangled photon pairs in the middle of the channel, and send one photon of each pair to Alice and one to Bob. We then use the BBM92 [12] protocol to make the key. Three sections means we perform teleportation [13] , with a single photon source with Alice, an entangled pair source two-thirds of the way from Alice to Bob, and a Bell measurement one-third of the way from Alice to Bob. With teleportation one then uses the BB84 protocol. Four sections means we use entanglement swapping, with two entangled sources 1 4 and 3 4 of the way down the channel, and a Bell measurement halfway down the channel. One can use the BBM92 protocol. For more sections, we use the natural extension of these ideas.
We here study the effectiveness of the quantum relay for quantum key distribution, under certain assumptions on the type of eavesdropping which may be performed. We shall show that the relay could be useful for small numbers of sections. However when many sections are introduced, the extra noise they introduce overwhelms their advantages, limiting the maximum achievable distance. One of the strongest proofs of quantum cryptography is by Inamori et al. [14] and considers an imperfect source, detectors and channel, and allows Eve to perform any attack on the channel, including a coherent attack upon many successive qubits. An elaboration is to even allow Eve some limited undetected control over Alice and Bob's laboratories, and to show that even then the protocol is still secure [15] . Here we consider a simplified scenario which contains the main idea of the quantum repeater and is nevertheless not too far from reasonable physical assumptions upon the limit of Eve's technology.
We assume that all the sources emit a single photon (or a perfect entangled pair of photons) every time, as opposed to being weak coherent pulses, or entangled pair sources which sometimes emit two pairs of photons and often no pairs at all. Thus Eve has no possibility for the photon number splitting (PNS) attack [16] . With a more realistic source which sometimes sends multi-photon pulses Eve could use the PNS attack to eavesdrop upon Alice's source. However there is a protocol which reduces the effectiveness of such eavesdropping [17] . Additionally, for even numbers of sections, we only have entangled photon pair sources and the PNS attack does not help Eve at all [1] .
Whilst including the PNS attack would not dramatically alter our results, a bigger effect would come from the loss of signal due to such imperfect sources. Typically a weak coherent pulse (or an entangled pair source) only sends a photon (pair) a fraction 0.1 of the time and thus would reduce the signal by a factor 0.1. If we have m sources, the signal between Alice and Bob will be reduced by a factor 0.1 m . This in turn would reduce the maximum distance at which we can create a key, by around 40m km. In addition it will reduce the key rate per pulse sent by a factor 0.1. This becomes important since we can at most pulse our source at around 10 GHz, and at long distances most of the photons will be lost, leading to low secret key rates.
Entangled sources which sometimes emit two pairs of photons also introduce noise, since Alice may detect only the photon from one pair and Bob only the photon from the other pair. Treating such noise would complicate our calculations, without changing the main message of the paper-that relays increase the possible distance of quantum cryptography-and so we ignore it by assuming perfect sources.
We shall assume that the channel has state-independent losses, that the detectors are inefficient, that they have dark counts and that there is some imperfect optical visibility in the channel. This shall allow us to calculate the signal (and noise) between Alice and Bob.
The idea of quantum cryptography is that Eve can learn nothing without introducing errors into the channel. For eavesdropping purposes we assume that Eve has improved the optical components which lie outside the laboratories of Alice and Bob, and that all the noise we had thought due to those components is actually due to Eve's cloning attack. Thus the noise due to optical imperfections and dark counts outside Alice's and Bob's laboratories can be due to the eavesdropper, but the dark counts inside Alice and Bob's laboratories cannot. This last point is in contrast to previous studies of the quantum relay, in which all the noise, regardless of its source, is considered due to the eavesdropper.
Since the last point has caused some debate, we shall review the assumptions which go into cryptography. One assumes that Alice and Bob are in two separate offices and that within each office Eve has no capability whatsoever. Eve may perform any operation allowed by the laws of physics anywhere outside the offices. There are two communication channels connecting the two offices, one classical and one quantum. The first assumption, that Eve cannot modify or hear anything which occurs inside Alice and Bob's offices, is impossible to verify in practice. However closely they look, Eve could always have planted a device inside their offices which is telling her everything they do. All that they can do is to search their offices as best they can for such a device and, so long as none is found, to assume that none exists. Similarly with the classical and quantum channels, we check that the sending and receiving equipment located in our offices is functioning as we expect and then assume that they continue to behave in this way. In particular, any dark counts inside our office are a consequence of the normal working of the receiver and so are out of the reach of Eve. Whilst we must check that our detector functions correctly, this is not a new assumption: it was always there in classical cryptography! Of course, any detectors outside the laboratories of Alice and Bob are under Eve's control and dark counts belonging to such detectors can be used for eavesdropping.
A related issue is the detector efficiency. If we increase the detector efficiency, the signal-to-noise ratio will increase, just as it did when we reduced the dark counts. Instead of altering the dark counts, Eve could alter the detector efficiency to gain some information. As with the dark counts, she can alter the efficiency of detectors outside Alice and Bob's laboratories, but not inside. She could influence the count rates inside Alice and Bob's laboratories by increasing the efficiency of the source, but they will detect this if they look at coincidence count rates. Looking at the information Eve learns about the bits sent, her possible alterations of the detector efficiency are equivalent to her possible alterations of the dark count rate and so we analyse only her dark count eavesdropping from now on.
We limit Eve to performing the optimal individual attack on single photons, i.e. cloning [18] the qubit and then measuring the clone after the bases are publicly announced. Whilst in principle she could perform quantum coherent attacks involving many successive qubits at once, we know of no simple way for her to use such an attack to her advantage. In order to reduce the mathematical complexity and focus upon our main task we ignore them.
To put our work into context, one of us (NG) co-authored two papers which included calculations for small numbers of relays for a scenario similar to the one here, but which allows Eve to use all the noise, including dark counts in Alice and Bob's laboratories, for her eavesdropping [1, 7] . Waks et al. [8] considered splitting the channel into several sections, each of which has an imperfect EPR source in the middle, and using entanglement swapping to create the entanglement between Alice and Bob and hence the key. Their scheme has the advantage that the PNS attack does not help Eve for such systems. They did not consider the teleportation-like schemes which we shall consider here. Jacobs et al. [9] considered a scheme in which a signal is sent down the channel and at various intervals it is 'relayed' using an EPR source and a Bell measurement located next to one another. Indeed, they introduced the relay terminology. They consider attenuation in the channel and dark counts in the detectors. Their scheme is closest in conception to a classical relay, but can be improved by spreading out the EPR sources and detectors down the channel, as we shall do here. 
Why distance is a problem
To analyse the key rate of the quantum relay under our specified conditions, we shall start with a single section of channel: i.e. having no relay at all. We consider the standard BB84 protocol [11] in which Alice first chooses a basis at random, either fj0i, j1ig, or f2 À1=2 ðj0i þ j1iÞ, 2 À1=2 ðj0i À j1iÞg. She then sends a random bit 0/1 encoded as the first/second basis vector. Bob measures in one of the two bases, choosing at random. Alice and Bob then publicly announce the bases in which they sent/measured the photon, using an authenticated public classical channel. They accept the result if they used the same basis.
A further rule is that if Bob gets clicks in both of his detectors simultaneously, the result is rejected. This is standard in our situation with perfect sources, but throws away useful information for countering the PNS attack when we are using weak laser pulses.
The bits which remain are collectively called the sifted key. Alice and Bob then perform error correction and privacy amplification to get a perfect shared secret key, about which Eve has almost zero knowledge.
To model the channel, we suppose there are losses of dB km À1 , i.e. that the probability the photon passes through d km of fibre is t ¼ 10
Àd=10 . The optical visibility, which is the visibility one would obtain between Alice and Bob with perfect source and detectors, is denoted V opt . One can view this as that with probability V opt , the optical part of the channel works perfectly, and with probability 1 À V opt , the channel gives white noise (an equal mixture of 0 and 1). Since most of the optical imperfections are due to imperfect detectors, we shall assume that this is constant and does not increase with distance. The probability of having a dark count in any one detector is D and the probability of detecting the photon when it arrives is . As stated before, we assume a perfect single photon source.
In order for Bob to correctly receive and accept the (noiseless) signal sent by Alice, the photon must pass the fibre unabsorbed (t) and without becoming noise (V opt ), and be detected in Bob's detector (). Bob must measure in the correct basis ( 1 2 ) and without a dark count in the wrong detector (1 À D). This gives the probability
For Bob to accept a bit for the sifted key, he must measure in the correct basis ( 1 2 ). Either a photon must pass the fibre (t) and be detected (), or no photon must be detected (1 À t) but instead a dark count in either detector (2D). There must also be no dark count in the other detector (1 À D). This gives a total probability
The noise is given by PðnoiseÞ ¼ PðtotalÞ À PðsignalÞ. Bob's visibility of Alice's Bit, V AB , is given by
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The probability that, when Bob detects something, Alice and Bob's bits of the sifted key agree is
Eve's knowledge about Alice's bit comes from replacing the imperfect optical visibility of the channel with perfect optical visibility and performing the optimal individual qubit attack which introduces an amount of noise equal to V opt . This was proven in [18] to be a cloning attack. The relationship between Eve's visibility of Alice's bit (V AE ) and the visibility she may use for eavesdropping (V opt ) is given by putting together equations (64), (7) and (67) of that paper [18] , resulting in the simple relation Figure 2 shows the visibility of Alice's bit for Bob (solid line) and for Eve (dashed line) with increasing distance. Here and elsewhere in this paper (unless otherwise stated), we take realistic experimental parameters for a photon of wavelength 1550 nm of ¼ 0:25 dB km À1 , ¼ 0:3, D ¼ 10 À4 and V opt ¼ 0:99. Section 7 contains a discussion of the possible trade-off between dark counts and detector efficiency.
At zero distance, Bob has a visibility of almost 0.99. This is because dark counts are negligible and so the visibility is approximately V opt . As the distance increases, more and more of the photons are absorbed whilst the dark counts remain constant, giving a lower signal-to-noise ratio and so worse visibility. Eve's visibility remains constant, since we have assumed that she can only use the optical visibility for eavesdropping, and this we assume constant. When Eve's visibility is better than Bob's, Alice and Bob can no longer make a secret key using one-way communication from Alice to Bob. It looks like we could go to 150 km or so, but this is partly due to our perfect single photon source. With a more realistic source which only emits a photon with probability 0.1, the signal will be diminished by 10 dB. A 10 dB loss is like 40 km of fibre and so we lose 40 km, giving us a maximum distance around 110 km (ignoring photon number splitting attacks).
Notice that one can tolerate a very noisy signal and still distil a secret key. This seems in contrast to various claims that the visibility must be above 2 À1=2 ¼ 0:707, or equivalently that the fidelity (PðA ¼ BÞ) must be above 0.854. The difference is that here we do not allow Eve to use the dark counts of the eavesdropper, whereas some other calculations do. This difference highlights the importance of good assumptions.
After error correction and privacy amplification, which we will assume performed optimally in the asymptotic limit with one way communication from Alice to Bob [19] , they share a perfectly secure key with a rate (per qubit sent) of
where H AE is the entropy of p PðA ¼ EÞ, i.e.
H AE ¼ Àp log 2 p À ð1 À pÞ log 2 ð1 À pÞ: ð8Þ Figure 3 shows the mutual information between Alice, Bob and Eve, per bit of sifted key. Eve's information about Alice's sent bit stays constant. Bob's only significantly changes in the region where the signal-to-noise ratio becomes small and quickly becomes lower than Eve's. Roughly speaking, a key can be distilled until the signal-to-noise ratio for Alice to Bob becomes small. The main part of the noise is constant (dark counts), whilst the main change of the signal is due to photon loss in the fibre.
An alternative method for distilling a key is called reverse conciliation [19, 20] and was previously used in continuous variable quantum cryptography. As we shall see, this allows secure keys at longer distances than the conventional forward reconciliation. The idea is to do as before, only centring the protocol on Bob rather than on Alice. This involves one way communication from Bob to Alice and gives a key rate of
where I BA ¼ I AB . The optimal eavesdropping attack for the reverse reconciliation is the same as that for the forward reconciliation [8] , and for perfect sources and detectors gives Eve the same information about Bob's bit as she learns about Alice's. With imperfect detectors, Eve will know less about Bob's bit than she does about Alice, since the dark counts will introduce noise into her knowledge. Thus Alice and Bob can perform secure cryptography at longer distances using such a protocol.
To calculate I BE , first see that Eve's optimal strategy is first to make a nondemolition measurement on the photon at the end of the channel, to see whether or not it has passed the many kilometres of fibre (probability (t)), without destroying its quantum state. If it has not (1 À t), the only way Bob can see anything is if he has a dark count, in which case Eve knows nothing about Bob's bit and I BE ¼ 0.
If the photon has passed the channel, in order for Bob to have a detection his detector must either detect the photon (), or have a dark count (ð1 À Þ2D). There must also be no dark count in the other detector (ð1 À DÞ), and Alice and Bob must measure in the same basis ( 1 2 ). To get the fraction of bits upon which Eve has some information, PðphotonpassÞ, we divide this by PðtotalÞ, giving
When the photon did indeed pass the channel, Eve's visibility is given by using the imperfect V opt to eavesdrop, which in the absence of dark counts would give her a visibility V BE ¼ ð1 À V 2 opt Þ 1=2 . With dark counts, Eve's visibility is less, since she does not know if Bob detects a photon (), or a dark count (ð1 À Þ2D). The visibility becomes
Following from this, the probability that Eve and Bob have the same bit when the photon passed the channel Now we have everything necessary to write down I BE .
and is plotted as the dotted line in figure 3 . Figure 4 shows the secret key rate which can be distilled at various different distances. For small distances, it drops exponentially with increasing distance due to the decrease in the sifted key length. For larger distances, it drops even more quickly to zero at some finite distance. Reverse reconciliation only gives a small advantage over forward reconciliation and so we shall ignore this difference in our relay calculations.
Another possibility to distil a secret key at longer distances would be to use two way communication, i.e. advantage distillation [21] . However the efficiency of all known protocols is so low that we shall neglect them.
The quantum relay
With a single section of channel, secure key creation over increasing distances becomes impossible essentially because the signal at Bob's detector decreases, whereas the dark counts remain constant. The first step to combatting this is to split the channel into two sections and place a (perfect) singlet source (making Quantum relays for long distance quantum cryptography2 À1=2 ðj01i À j10iÞ) in the middle. One expects a key to be possible until the signal-tonoise ratio in each detector is similar to what it was with just one section. Since each photon only travels down half of the channel, this means that the maximum total distance roughly doubles.
Since we are no longer sending a photon from Alice to Bob we need a new protocol. We use BBM92 [12] (a development of Ekert's protocol [5] ), which is conceptually similar to BB84. Alice and Bob each measure in one of the two bases of the BB84 protocol and know that the results should be perfectly anti-correlated if they measure in the same basis. They then perform sifting, error correction and privacy amplification as for the BB84 protocol.
The next step is to split the channel into three sections and use a teleportation protocol. This should give us a total distance about three times that of the single section protocol. After these four sections there is entanglement swapping and we can keep adding sections, hoping to get an n-fold increase in distance for n-sections. However adding more sections also adds more sources of noise, which will make adding more sections counter-productive after some optimal number of sections. This limits the maximum possible distance of this method.
To see these effects quantitatively, we shall begin by calculating Bob's visibility of Alice's qubit. We shall look at increasing the distance and more sections. Then we shall turn to eavesdropping and the mutual information between Alice, Bob and Eve. Next we shall look at the key rates and give a simple approximate formula for the maximum possible distance at which a key can be distilled for different numbers of sections. Finally we shall examine the experimentally tunable trade-off between increased detector efficiency and more dark counts, and see how this affects the key rates and maximum possible distances.
Visibility of the quantum relay
For the visibility between Alice and Bob, we begin with two sections. To have a sifted key bit, both Alice and Bob must have exactly one click. Since the source is perfect, these probabilities are independent. If the source is in the middle of the channel they are both equal to
where t 1=2 is the probability for a photon to pass half of the channel. Thus the probability of a sifted key bit is
The signal, when Alice and Bob both receive something noiseless, is
where V 2opt is the optical visibility across the whole length of the channel.
For three sections, we use teleportation, with a linear optics Bell measurement. It is not possible to distinguish the four Bell states using linear optics [22] : the best one can do is to have three outcomes: the first Bell state, the second Bell state and 'not the first or second Bell states'. For example, we may encode our qubits as single photon time bins, arriving now encoding a j0i, and arriving later encoding a j1i. If our two qubits are in different fibres, we may combine them on a beam-splitter and Since the Bell measurement only works half the time for uncorrelated inputs (such as we have here), the noiseless signal is now
The total signal is more complicated than before. The chance of Bob getting one count at his detector is similar to before,
However the chance of accepting the clicks at the Bell measurement is slightly reduced from p 2 3 , since half the time when the two photons both trigger a detector, they are both triggering the same detector at the same time, and we only see one detection. So we subtract this probability: (À 1 2 ðt 1=3 Þ 2 ð1 À DÞ 2 ). If this happens (i.e. both photons are 'detected', but we only see one detection event), we can still see a coincidence if there is a dark count in another detector. Since there are two other detectors where the dark count would give us the same result as a Bell state, this has probability (þ2D
. This gives a total probability
We now have all the elements to generalize this to n sections.
where bxc is x rounded down to the nearest integer.
In figure 5 we show the ten visibility curves for splitting a channel of increasing distance into 1. . .10 sections. The leftmost curve is for 1 section, then moving to the right we pass through 2, 3 and so on up to 10. We take V nopt ¼ V n opt , which is why the visibility at 0 distance decreases with increasing sections.
Using more sections allows us to increase the visibility at long distances and for low visibilities we have the approximately linear increase in distance with the number of sections that we mentioned before. There is a limit to this: however many relays we use we shall never get a better visibility than 0:9 at more than 300 km. This is because we are introducing more detectors and hence more dark counts with more sections. Moving from an even number of sections to an odd is not as useful as the other way around since we have to add a Bell measurement, which is noisy since it only works for half of the Bell states.
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The quantum relay for cryptography
To see how the quantum relay helps cryptography, we have to calculate the various mutual informations. Between Alice and Bob, this is simple: for any number of sections
To calculate Eve's information, we begin with two sections. For her optimal strategy, we view the protocol as if it is BB84 and assume the same attack as before. This was shown to be the optimal individual attack in [8] . The exact equation for Eve's knowledge of Alice's bit is more complicated than before, because of the dark counts in Alice's detectors the value of which she knows nothing about. In this respect it is similar to Eve's knowledge of Bob in the BB84 case (equation (13)).
where By symmetry, I BE ¼ I AE . For three sections, Eve can use the errors due to the dark counts at the Bell measurements as well as the optical visibility to eavesdrop. The visibility between Alice and Bob of these errors is given by
Eve's visibility of Alice's bit is given by ½1 À ðV E AB Þ 2 1=2 , and so
Eve's visibility of Bob's bit is
where
We can now write down the equations for dividing the channel into n equal sections.
: ð32Þ
, for odd n, I BE ; for even n,
As before, the secret key rate is PðtotalÞðI AB À I AE Þ. Figure 6 shows the difference in the mutual informations for various distances when splitting the channel into 1. . .20 sections. In order to simplify the calculations, we have used the bound
This bound comes from assuming (for Eve's purposes) that there are no dark counts, giving her more information than she really has.
More sections give us a significant improvement over a single section. There is a limit to the distance we can achieve with the relay as the benefits of adding more sections are negated by the extra dark counts and losses introduced. Moving from an even number of sections to an odd number does not gain very much because we introduce an extra Bell measurement, whose dark count noise can be used by Eve for eavesdropping. Figure 7 shows the secret key rate for several sections. Adding more sections does not increase the rate at short distances, but rather increases the maximum distance at which a secret key can be distilled. There are two limits to the maximum number of useful sections. The more fundamental one is that after around 18 sections we are introducing too much noise and so no longer gaining anything. The more practical one is that even if we pulse the system at 10 GHz, the key rate with more than four sections will be too low to be of any use. We have drawn a line where the secret key will be generated at 1 bit min À1 if pulsed at 10 GHz. This problem will be of even more consequence in the laboratory, where the sources are not perfect and the rate will be lower still. Although there is a fundamental limit of around 650 km using our quantum relay assumptions, the more important limit is when the losses make the key rate too low to be of use. Figure 8 shows the maximum distance at which we can extract a secret key when we split the channel into increasing numbers of sections. For the parameters used here, the maximum is for 18 sections and allows a secret key at around 650 km.
The maximum achievable distance
This behaviour can be understood by a much simpler formula. First assume that all the noise in the system, including the dark counts in Alice and Bob's laboratories, is available for eavesdropping. This will be a good approximation for large numbers of relays, since most of the detectors will be in Eve's possession. Then Eve's visibility 1=2 . In order to distil a secret key, Bob must have a better visibility of Alice's bit than Eve, i.e.
Solving this gives
To simplify the calculation of the visibility, we shall assume that ð1 À DÞ ' 1, and that for long distances ð1 À t 1=n Þ ' 1. If we imagine for a minute that the Bell measurement is perfect then
Together with equation (37) this gives
We just need to modify this for the effect of imperfect Bell measurements. 
We see that the effect of the imperfect measurements is roughly to double the effective dark counts. Thus,
The dashed line in figure 8 plots this function, which is similar to the results obtained using the more precise equations.
Detector efficiency versus dark counts
A key part in any cryptosystem is the quality of the detectors. We would like the detector efficiency to be as high as possible, so that the efficiency of the relay is not too low. We would also like the dark count probability to be as low as possible, to reduce the noise and allow us to make a secret key at long distances. In general these two aims pull in different directions: increasing the efficiency also increases the dark counts. We have to compromise to find the best detector for our set-up. Figure 9 shows the efficiency/dark count trade-off for high quality InGaAs APD detectors operating at À508C at telecom wavelength, 1550 nm [23] . In order to get the maximal possible distance at which a key can be distilled, we see from equation (42) that we need to maximize /D. The best detector is the one with the smallest possible dark counts, i.e. ¼ 0.05, d ' 10 À6 . The problem with such detectors is that the efficiency is so low that the rate of secret key generation becomes very low. For a fixed distance, it is usually better to take detectors with better efficiency. In figure 10 we plot the secret key rates at 400 km of relays with 4 . . . 6 sections with the good detectors of figure 9 . The rates for 1 . . . 3 sections are 0. The rates are all low since 400 km of fibre has a transmission probability of 10 À10 , and we also need a coincidence between 4, 5 or 6 photons. We see that the best rates are attained when using the fewest sections of relay possible, in this case four. For a fixed number of sections, the rates generally increase with increasing efficiency (and hence increasing dark counts), until just before the dark counts become large and forbid us from making a secret key. For this distance we should take an efficiency around 0.18.
The main lesson here is that whilst we need detectors with low dark counts to allow us a non-zero key rate at longer distances, it is equally important for the quantum relay to find detectors with a high efficiency. Such detectors would allow a Quantum relays for long distance quantum cryptographyhigher key rate at long distances, extending the range of practical quantum cryptography.
Conclusion
The quantum relay significantly improves the distance at which quantum cryptography is possible. With the physical assumptions made here, one can go about four times as far with a multi-section relay as one can with a single section protocol. The distance of the relay is not unlimited because the noise added by additional sections counteracts the potential gain. We hope that even with present technology one may be able to go to two or three times the single-section distance by using an arrangement with only three [10] or four sections.
We have also seen that for the quantum relay to be useful, we need detectors with a high efficiency. This is because at long distances we already have lots of loss in the fibre. If we introduce too many more losses by adding detectors, we are left with a key rate so small as to be effectively 0.
One configuration which is better than those we have considered here uses high efficiency (and hence high dark count probability) detectors for Alice and Bob, and detectors with much lower dark counts (and so lower efficiency) in the middle of the relay. This is useful since the dark counts in Alice and Bob's laboratories cannot be used by Eve, and so we boost the count rate whilst keeping good security. This is a small step towards quantum cryptography on a national scale. Improved sources and detectors will increase the distance, but either coherent manipulation of large numbers of qubits or satellites will be required to bring quantum cryptography to the world scale. We hope that one day, using small sources and detectors, a quantum cryptographic modem will form a part of everyone's personal computer.
